Third-party script became an attack route

A security incident involving Optimizely's Web Experimentation service allowed malicious JavaScript to reach 178 websites, according to reporting published on November 19, 2026. The affected group included sites associated with the BBC, CNN, Equifax, Zoom, Alaska Airlines and IKEA, showing how a compromise at one widely embedded vendor can spread across otherwise unrelated organisations.

Optimizely's product is used to test and personalise web pages. In this incident, an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability and inserted code into customer projects. Researchers said the payload was designed to skim payment-card details, replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses and capture screenshots from visitors' devices. The full number of people exposed and the amount of stolen payment data remained unknown.

Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found that the injected script closely resembled legitimate Optimizely code, a characteristic that could help it avoid immediate attention. Report URI had also identified slightly more than $7,000 arriving at a cryptocurrency address connected with the campaign by Tuesday. That figure measures only observed transfers, not the incident's overall impact.

Vendor says injected code was removed

Optimizely said it fixed the vulnerability, removed the malicious code from affected projects, secured impacted accounts and added protections intended to stop unauthorised code delivery. The company described the event as a security incident in which an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability. Researchers had first detected the code on the BBC website on Monday and observed the attacker modifying it as the campaign continued.

Some customers responded by disabling or abandoning the service while they investigated. Zoom said it had disabled Optimizely in production as a precaution and had not found an impact on customer data. Equifax said it stopped using the platform and had found no evidence that its systems or data were compromised. Those statements distinguish the presence of a tainted third-party component from a confirmed breach of each customer's internal systems.

The incident illustrates the concentration risk created by software loaded into many websites. A service used for page experiments can execute in visitors' browsers and therefore occupies a sensitive position in the delivery chain. When that position is abused, the resulting exposure crosses industries and corporate boundaries even if customers' own infrastructure is not directly penetrated.

Investigators had not established how many cards or other payment methods were captured, and it was not clear from the available evidence whether every affected implementation had been fully remediated. Users and organisations therefore faced a continuing need to review exposure rather than treating the list of affected sites as proof of individual data theft.